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ADVICE, CONSENT, AND INFLUENCE
Robert F Nagel*
Article II, section 2 of the Constitution states that the President
"shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court . . . ." This provision
presents important questions about the appropriate division of responsibilities between the President and the Senate. A correlative matter is the
extent of the responsibility of a judicial nominee to provide information
during the appointment process.
Although some politicians and a few academics continue to articulate doubts and reservations about energetic, substantive Senate review of
judicial nominees, we seem-as a matter of both practice and theory-to
be drifting toward a norm of active Senate participation. I shall begin by
describing this norm, its intellectual bases, and some of its operational
implications. I then raise some doubts about the norm and suggest a
slightly different role for the Senate. In general terms, the point I want
to develop is that screening the beliefs of nominees may be at odds with
the goal of establishing political influence over the Supreme Court. Influence may depend not so much on the decision whether to "consent" as
on the utilization of the confirmation process as an opportunity to give
"advice."
I.
It is somewhat hazardous to generalize about a developing norm of
active Senate participation in the judicial selection process. Even very
recent history shows considerable variation. Since 1894, only John
Parker, Abe Fortas, Clement Haynesworth, G. Harrold Carswell, Robert
Bork, and Douglas Ginsburg can fairly be said to have been rejected by
the Senate.' Indeed, it is common to contrast the vigorous nineteenthcentury tradition of Senate review with a relatively mild twentieth-century record. 2 Despite the recent experiences of Bork and Ginsburg, the
* Rothgerber Professor of Constitutional Law at the University of Colorado School of Law.
Work on this Article was also done while the author was Lee Visiting Professor at the Bill of Rights
Institute, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
1 See Friedman, The Transformation in Senate Response to Supreme Court Nominations: From
Reconstruction to the Taft Administration and Beyond, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 1, 1-2, n.l, 2 (1983).
Friedman does not count Homer Thornberry because he was not confirmed "for technical reasons."
Id. at 2 n.2.
2 Id. at 1-3. See also Monaghan, The Confirmation Process: Law or Politics?, 101 HARv. L.

84:858 (1990)

Advice, Consent, and Influence

Senate during the past ten years has approved Rehnquist (as Chief Justice), O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy. The thoroughness of the evaluation of these individuals has fluctuated, and at least sometimes
questioning was casual. Some senators continue to assert that their
proper role is a limited one, 3 while others can be expected to rediscover
the attractions of institutional modesty when the political backdrop
changes.
Nevertheless, on the whole, we are developing a norm of active Senate participation-a conscientious effort to evaluate not only the nominees' qualifications, but also their beliefs and probable voting patterns on
the Court. The most dramatic evidence of such a norm is the Senate's
consideration of Robert Bork's nomination. The Senate's inquiry was
prolonged and detailed; it led to the rejection of a person who has been
plausibly described as one of the "best qualified candidates for the
Supreme Court of this or any other era."'4 This action was not-or did
not appear to be-based on geographic, ethnic, or other narrow political
considerations. Rather, it appeared to be based on disagreement with the
nominee's judicial philosophy and with dissatisfaction over the positions
he was likely to take if appointed to the Court.
There are a number of reasons to believe that the Bork nomination
represents not an aberration, but an especially vivid manifestation of the
underlying current norm. A judicial nominee first appeared at a confirmation hearing in 1925. 5 Since 1955, such appearances have become an
entrenched practice. 6 Beginning in 1959, with the hearings on Potter
Stewart's nomination, senators have considered it proper to use the occasion of the nominee's appearance to inquire about specific cases, judicial
philosophy, and attitudes on issues likely to come before the Court.7
While different nominees have set different limits on how willing they are
to answer these questions, generally they do not resist the idea that senators should be interested in such matters. Indeed, intellectually strong
nominees like Fortas, Rehnquist, and Bork on occasion have openly
REv. 1202, 1202-03 (1988). Nina Totenberg claims that until 1987, Senate hearings illuminated
"almost nothing about the nominee's views." Totenberg, The Confirmation Process and the Public:
To Know or Not to Know, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1213 (1988).
3 Eg., Hatch, Save the Courtfrom What? (Book Review), 99 HARv. L. REv. 1347 (1986). See
also Friedman, supra note 1, at 83.
4 Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARv.L. REv. 1106 (1988).
5 Comment, Musta Supreme CourtJusticeRefuse to Answer Senators' Questions?, 78 YALE L.J.
696, 705 (1969). As late as 1949, Sherman Minton refused to appear. Freund, Appointment of
Justices: Some HistoricalPerspectives, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1146, 1161 (1988).
6 See Ross, The Questioningof Supreme CourtNominees at Senate ConfirmationHearing. Proposalsfor Accommodating the Needs of the Senate andAmeliorating the Fears of the Nominees, 62
TUL. L. REv. 109, 119 (1987).
7 Freund, supranote 5, at 1151-53, 1157; Powe, The Senate andthe Court: Questioninga Nominee (Book Review), 54 TEx. L. REv. 891, 892 (1976); Rees, Questionsfor Supreme CourtNominees
at Confirmation Hearings: Excluding the Constitution, 17 GA. L. REv. 913, 945 (1983). Freund,
supra note 5, at 1151-53, 1157.
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praised and welcomed broad inquiries. Ideological review quickly has become the common practice and accepted norm.
The most compelling reason for senators to concern themselves with
the ideology and philosophy of nominees is the same reason that Presidents do. Although it is fashionable (and also partially accurate) to characterize the Burger Court's record as vacillating, uninspiring, and
moderately conservative," the deeper truth is that in the twenty years
since the appointment of Warren Burger as Chief Justice, the extent of
the Supreme Court's influence over public policy has grown significantly
and inexorably. Beginning roughly in 1971, the Court began to announce a series of doctrines that vastly increased the range of issues subject to judicial supervision. Thus, under the Burger Court, the federal
courts used racial classifications and a host of costly devices to achieve
integrated results in hundreds of school districts. Judicial management of
prison systems in more than two-thirds of the states was established. For
the first time, the Court undertook systematic monitoring of public aid to
parochial schools. The Burger Court initiated serious review of governmental use of gender classifications. It insisted on judicial supervision of
public regulation of abortion. It imposed minimal procedural protections on the decisionmaking procedures of public schools, prison disciplinary boards, university tenure committees, and other public institutions.
It labeled as "speech" advertising, exotic dancing, and campaign contributions and extended first amendment protections to prisoners and corporations. It supervised the design of death penalty statutes and made
profoundly important determinations about the operation of the executive branch, including the need for confidentiality in Presidential conversations and the impact of legislative vetoes in hundreds of federal
statutes. It opened the door for judicial supervision of patronage, jury
selection, political gerrymandering, and criminal sentencing. While the
Warren Court made judicial power seem dramatic and morally exciting,
the Burger Court made judicial power seem routine and inevitable.
Twenty years ago, it might have been possible to believe that the
appointment of a few competent, gray-haired Republicans to the Court
would remove the federal judiciary from many areas of political controversy. It is now clear that, in one direction or another, the Court will be
a pervasive influence on a wide range of issues that can only in a partial
and peripheral way be considered legal rather than political. What legal
realism established intellectually, the Burger Court established as a matter of brute fact.
During approximately the same period, as the Burger Court was
decisively destroying any possibility of believing that the Court's function
is nonpolitical, the less important justifications for limited Senate review
8 See V. BLASI, THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T (1983);
Alschuler, FailedPragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1436 (1987).
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were also being discredited. Writing in 1970, Charles L. Black, Jr., concluded an important essay on the judicial selection process by stating:
To me, there is just no reason at all for a Senator's not voting, in regard to confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee, on the basis of a full and
unrestricted review, not embarrassed by any presumption, of the nominee's
fitness for the office. In a world that knows a man's social philosophy
shapes his judicial behavior, that philosophy is a factor in his fitness. If it is
a philosophy the Senator thinks will make a judge whose service on the
Bench will hurt the country, then the Senator can do right only by treating
this judgment of his, unencumbered by deference to the President's, as a
satisfactory basis in itself for a negative vote. I have as yet seen nothing
textual, nothing structural, nothing prudential, nothing historical, that tells
against this view. 9
Although Black ended his commentary with an invitation to his
readers to refute him, there have been few significant and no generally
accepted efforts to do so. Black's basic constitutional arguments, while
stated tentatively, remain persuasive. It is true, as he argued, that the
phrase "advice and consent" does not itself suggest a limited role-indeed, the word "advice" connotes free-wheeling consideration of any factor that might be thought relevant to a President's decision. It is also
true, as he argued, that Justices are not a part of the executive branch
and therefore, that nothing inherent to the President's executive duties
requires legislative deference. I have not seen any effort to refute Black's
assessment of the framers' intent, an assessment that emphasized early
proposals giving sole power of appointment to the Senate and subsequent
arguments that seemed to assume a significant role for the Senate.10
Potentially, of course, the most far-reaching objection to the Black
position is based on formalistic assumptions. To the extent that the task
of judges is only to find the law in legal texts-if social philosophy does
not and should not "shape judicial behavior"-it can be thought that the
Senate's role should be restricted to assessing a nominee's technical skills.
Yet, inquiry into opinions about specific cases might be relevant here,
too, since the best proof of technical skills might be demonstrated by
textual or historical interpretation." In any event, few today would reject Black's position by rejecting his realist assumptions.
A modem version of the formalist argument does exist, although it
is a dissenting view. Some commentators, including Stephen Carter, argue that inquiries into philosophy tend to degenerate into inquiries about
9 Black, A Note on Senatorial Consideration of Supreme Court Nominees, 79 YALE L.J. 657,
663-64 (1970).
10 For historical analyses consistent with Black's, see Carter, The ConfirmationMess, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1185, 1187 (1988); Freund, supra note 5, at 1147; Monaghan, supra note 2, at 1204-07;
Rees, supranote 7, at 938 n.77. Bruce Fein takes a narrower view of the relevant intent, but only as
a matter of emphasis. Fein, A CircumscribedSenate Confirmation Role, 102 HARV. L. REV. 672,
677 (1989).
11 See Rees, supra note 7, at 932.
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probable voting patters-a result Carter considers inconsistent with judicial review because that institution is intended to "thwart, not to further, the self-interested programs of temporary majorities." 12 The nature
of the judicial function, then, requires that the Senate aim its review at
deeper considerations. What kinds of considerations? Because Carter
fully accepts the realist view that "[tihere is in every interpretative task a
moment when the interpreter's own experience and values become the
most important data," 13 he concludes that the Senate should judge the
nominee as a person: would she possess "the right moral instincts"?14
Thus the modern version of the formalist position leads to a kind of
moral technocratic standard; the issue is not whether the nominee is a
skilled lawyer, but whether the nominee is a good person.
Carter's position would divert Senate attention from both general
and specific legal beliefs to evaluating a candidate's personal qualities.
But even a senator accepting Carter's position might reach much the
same kinds of conclusions about the scope of a proper inquiry as did
Charles Black. Probable votes are, by Carter's own assumptions, one
measure of personal moral qualities. And while it may be true that concer about specific decisional outcomes will tend to be associated with
narrow self-interest, it is not necessarily true that self-interest is unrelated
to the kinds of profound values that Carter and others think judicial review should protect. Indeed, Carter's concept of judicial review is that
fundamental, long-term aspirations can be given expression in the accretion of specific decisions that the Court makes. If so, it is hard to see why
political interest in specific results, even if self-interested, cannot also be
connected to profound, lasting hopes and beliefs.
A related argument is that the Senate should confine its evaluation
to the nominee's professional fitness (rather than moral fitness) because
narrow professionalism is all the Senate is qualified to judge. As Bruce
Fein engagingly writes, "[tihe Senate, simply stated, is ill-suited intellectually, morally, and politically to pass on anything more substantive than
a nominee's professional fitness .... Because senators tend to be intellectually shallow and result-oriented, their ostensible inquiries into 'judicial
15
philosophy' will almost invariably degenerate into partisan posturing."
This is not a basis for a nominee's refusal to answer questions, unless
nominees are entitled to censor the information available to the Senate on
the basis of their own assessment of the capacities of those who are supposed to be assessing them. If, on the other hand, the argument is addressed to the Senate, it seems safe to say it is unlikely to succeed. And it
should not. Democratic self-government requires that elected officials
12 Carter, supra note 10, at 1193. For similar views, see Fein, supra note 10, at 673 and Ross,
supra note 6, at 145.
13 Carter, supra note 10, at 1199.
14 Id.
15 See Fein, supra note 10, at 673.
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decide issues about which they are not expert. Legislators are obliged to
deal with matters, such as nuclear strategy and economic policy, that are
at least as esoteric as judicial philosophy. Unless judicial confirmation
can be distinguished from all other legislative duties, Fein's argument is
in principle an attack on representative government. Moreover, even
passing the dubious claim that senators tend to be intellectually more
shallow than judicial nominees or the executive branch officials who select them, it still does not follow that the Senate is in fact unqualified to
inquire into jurisprudential questions. Philosophy and doctrine are not,
after all, self-contained. Legal ideas have consequences-they change
lives. Senators are certainly qualified to consider the impact of the law's
abstractions.
Other proposals for limiting the Senate's role are relatively modest,
and none is especially persuasive. Some are simply prudential. Senator
Orrin Hatch, for example, argues that substantive review by the Senate
creates a risk of deadlock as each political party retaliates for the last
rejection.1 6 More generally, some who have studied the often tawdry history of Senate participation in judicial selection conclude that the process
can diminish the public's perception of the Court "as an independent
institution." 17 In both instances, the concern is ultimately about the effect of Senate review on the functioning of the Court. Such risks are real,
but they argue for responsible ideological review rather than for some
technocratic standard. Excessive partisanship and diminished respect for
the Court are dangers, but another danger is that a functioning and
respected Court will, in Black's words, "hurt the country." If the predicted harm is great and seems likely, a senator could sensibly conclude
that damage to the Court was the lesser risk. Even a senator who believed that damage to the Court's prestige always outweighs other harms
might adopt Black's position; such a senator might conclude that confirming a profoundly misguided nominee would result in judicial policies
that represented more of a threat to the Court as an institution than
would active Senate screening.
Felix Frankfurter, while conceding the legitimacy of the Senate's interest in a nominee's beliefs, appeared to think that personal appearance
was undignified and unnecessary. 18 Paul Freund still takes something
close to this view. 19 While many would concede that personal testimony
is often an inefficient and even ineffective way to evaluate a nominee, it is
surely impossible to take the position that a nominee's answers and demeanor are inevitably unhelpful or irrelevant.
Abe Fortas tried to embellish the Frankfurter position with notions
of separation of powers. This argument, constructed on an implausible
16
17
1
19

Hatch, supra note 3, at 1352-53.
Friedman, supra note 1, at 85.
See Comment, supra note 5, at 705.
Freund, supra note 5, at 1163.
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analogy to the Speech and Debate Clause, applied only to sitting federal
judges and did not rule out most general jurisprudential questions. Fortas's position was icily and effectively criticized in a student note in the
Yale Law Journal,20 and I doubt that it will be revived. Separation of
powers is, however, still invoked in the form of a distinction between
questions about general philosophy and questions about specific cases,
especially cases that are likely to come before the Court.
This distinction can be couched as an aspect of separation of powers
because the articulated concern is to protect the integrity of the Court's
decisionmaking process. It is thought that answers about specific cases
or issues might bind the nominee in future deliberations or, at the least,
appear to be trading a future vote for confirmation. One of the difficulties with this limitation is that its implications for nominees' behavior are
so unclear. It can be thought to preclude answers that bear on any matter that might come before the Court; if so, a nominee could refuse to
discuss all issues, opinions, or beliefs relevant to virtually any legal question. 2 1 It can be construed more narrowly and preclude only the communication of legal opinions (as distinguished from political philosophy,
personal views, and so on). 22 More narrowly still, it might apply only to
debatable cases or to cases that the nominee actually foresees coming
before the Court. 23 Recent nominees have generally thought the limitation consistent with appearing personally and with answering questions
about both legal philosophy and at least some specific legal issues. 24 The
limitation is difficult to maintain during the course of questioning. 2 5 In
any event, it does not restrict senators' voting on the basis of predictions
about a nominee's positions on cases likely to arise. As usually formulated, it only regulates sources of information rather than the types of
information that senators are entitled to consider. The limitation is confusing in its implications and more an irritant than an important challenge to the premises behind the norm of active, ideological review.
Even this minimal restriction has been subjected to powerful criticism. Grover Rees, who had some responsibility for judicial selections in
the Reagan Justice Department, argues that views on specific cases are a
relevant and important basis for understanding a nominee's actual philosophy and temperament, and that questions can be framed to ask for
present opinions rather than for commitments. 26 Of course, public cyniComment, supra note 5.
Something like this view might underlie a refusal to appear at all.
22 This was close to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's position, which is criticized severely in Rees,
20
21

supra note 7, at 949.
23 For samples of nominees who took these positions, see id. at 958-60.
24 Robert Bork, of course, answered such questions for days. For earlier illustrations, see Rees,
supra note 7, at 954-55.
25 For examples, see id. at 955, 965. This would be an especially acute problem for a nominee
attempting to follow the sorts of fine distinctions suggested by Ross, supra note 6, at 145-72.
26 Rees, supra note 7, at 962.
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cism is sufficient to create some danger of an appearance of impropriety,
but this is a problem even if nominees resist public expression of opinions
about particular cases. After all, the whole point of active Senate review
is to decide whether a nominee's "service on the Bench will hurt the
country"-a determination which, as a practical matter, requires predicting a nominee's votes on particular cases. Questions about personal background, general philosophy, and judicial approach are patently designed
to afford a basis for such predictions. Moreover, the nominee's answers
are usually designed to provide vague reassurance about future voting
behavior. In this circumstance, avoiding direct discussion of what everyone is interested in seems at best a nicety and at worst a charade. 27 The
appearance of impropriety is implicit in a process where probable legal
positions of a nominee are thought to be the proper business of the Senate. Such an appearance can be reduced, as Rees argues, by carefully
maintaining the distinction between a nominee's preliminary opinion and
a judge's final determination. The public either understands and credits
the significance of the adjudicatory process and of a judge's life tenure, or
it does not. Dancing around important topics at confirmation hearings
does not seem a useful additional protection.
The perplexing issue is not whether a nominee should refuse to answer questions about cases that might arise; the difficult issue is to identify the outer limits to a proper exchange on this subject. Suppose a
nominee is asked, "Will you commit here and now to vote to overturn [or
to uphold] Roe v. Wade?" Suppose, further, that the inquiring senator
adds, "Before you answer, let me emphasize that your response will
largely determine for me whether your service on the bench will hurt the
country, so unless you tell me you are going to reverse [uphold] Roe, I
am going to vote against you." Now, assume a nominee answers the
question directly: "Senator, read my lips; I will vote to reverse [uphold]
Roe v. Wade at the first opportunity." This exchange at first seems reprehensible. The nominee has indicated how a case should be decided and
has done so in an apparent effort to gain appointment to the Court.
However, the exchange only takes realism seriously. To use Professor
Black's words again, "in a world that knows that a man's social philosophy shapes his judicial behavior," it is necessary to admit that personal
27 During the Bork hearings, for example, Senator Specter piously disclaimed any intent to ask
the nominee how he would decide any "specific case." Nomination ofRobert H. Bork to be Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United Statesr HearingsBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 719 (1987) [hereinafter Bork Hearings]. At many other points, however,
Specter seemed to be pressing for specific commitments and, in any event, he understood that his
more general questions were aimed at discerning probable positions that Bork would take on later
cases. See id. at 415 ("if you still disagree philosophically with Brandenburg, . . . that raises a
question in my mind as to how you will apply it to the next set of facts"). See also id. at 264 (Bork
tells Specter that "my doubts about the substantive due process of Boiling v. Sharpe does not mean
that I would ever dream of overruling Boiling v. Sharpe.. ."), and 695 (Specter asks "to be sure"
whether Bork would not reverse commerce clause decisions).

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

belief can influence a judge's decision and in some circumstances might
be determinative. This is to say that any self-aware person could know,
without regard to the particulars of a lawsuit, how she is going to vote in
at least some cases. It is unimportant that the nominee's answer is made
in an effort to gain confirmation, because an honest nominee would want
his or her intentions to coincide with the preferences of both the President and the Senate. That is what makes the nomination appropriate to
begin with.
Suppose the question is changed to this: "Will you commit here and
now not to vote to reverse Brown v. Board of Education?" As others have
suggested,2 8 anyone who could not answer this question probably does
not deserve to be a judge. It is not a significant distinction between the
question about Brown and the question about Roe that Brown is "settled"
law. The content of an answer about Brown can communicate predispo29
sitions with respect to those desegregation issues likely to be litigated.
Anyway, one reason for asking about a settled case is to ensure that it
remains settled; the nominee's answer about Brown is in a sense more of a
commitment than the answer about Roe, because the former is a commitment not even to hear a case. Both answers would be relevant to the
Senate's inquiry because both cases are exceedingly important. Nominees can provide firm answers, not because the legal problems in either
case are easy, but because both cases turn on basic issues of legal philosophy and personal morality. The Senate's job in the nomination process is
to get such commitments, and the nominees' responsibility is to give the
best present opinions that they can.
This does not mean that a nominee should make specific commitments with respect to any case or with respect to long "laundry lists" of
potential cases. But this proviso does not rest on the need to protect the
judicial process. The problem is not that "commitments" are being
made. If it is a president's or a senator's task to use the nomination
process to shape a Court that will not harm the country, a nominee's
detailed set of commitments would seem better than a few commitments
on major issues like desegregation or abortion. But the longer the list of
cases on which the nominee is willing to take positions, the less plausible
is the claim that the particulars of the facts or the argumentation should
make no difference. Thus, willingness to make commitments on many
cases (and hence on close cases) would not exactly be improper; it might,
however, indicate reckless disregard for specifics. The problem is not
separation of powers; the problem is an unjudicious nominee. A nominee
trying to avoid this impression need not refuse to answer, but instead
might simply resort to Rees's distinction and emphasize the tentative na28 Cf. Friedman, supra note 1, at 94.
29 That was why Senator Specter, for example, said he was asking about Brandenburgv. Ohio.
See Bork Hearings,supra note 27, at 415.
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ture of preliminary opinions. The less fundamental or the more numerous the issues, the more plausible the distinction.
In sum, the major modem limitation on the Senate's role-the rule
that nominees should not answer questions about how they will vote on
specific issues that might come before the Court-is a weak constraint.
While it can be used as an excuse for avoiding controversial issues, as a
conscientious position it should not prevent answers on a few major issues about which a nominee can properly have inflexible views; nor
should it prevent answers on any number of minor issues if the nominee's
response is framed carefully to maintain the distinction between opinions
of a nominee and decisions of a Justice.
We are developing a norm of substantive, ideological Senate review
of nominees to the Supreme Court because, as Charles Black saw almost
twenty years ago, there is one very strong reason for active review-that
is, the broad impact that the Court's performance has on public policyand no strong reasons against it. In addition to Black, those who have
endorsed the norm of active Senate participation represent a wide range
of philosophies and include Bruce Ackerman, William Brennan, Robert
Bork, Ronald Dworkin, Abe Fortas, John Harlan, Philip Kurland,
Henry Monaghan, Grover Rees, William Rehnquist, and Laurence
Tribe. It is now the conventional wisdom to view the appointment process as an appropriate occasion for the political culture to communicate
its views on legal issues to the federal judiciary and thereby to shape the
development of the law.30 For so many to agree that politics should influence law, perhaps, is not surprising today. But given the realistic assumptions underlying the conventional wisdom, it is surprising that so
much emphasis is placed on controlling the identity of the specific individuals appointed to the bench.
II.
The logic of the conventional wisdom seems straightforward. If it is
a proper responsibility of politicians to influence the development of the
law, then politicians should carefully screen individual nominees to maximize the chances that preferred values will be reflected in the Court's
opinions. The assumption is that trying to predict judicial behavior will
at least be more effective than the alternatives, which are usually assumed to amount only to some form of non-ideological review (or "rubber-stamping"). This is the innocent logic of purposeful behavior: why
not at least try?
One answer is that in the area of judicial selection, as in so many
30 Evidence for this proposition is collected in Rees, supranote 7, at 923-24. See also Ross, supra
note 6, at 109. For a fairly typical articulation of the accepted realist position, see Lively, The
Supreme Court Appointment Process In Search of ConstitutionalRoles and Responsibilities, 59 S.
CAL. L. Rnv. 551 (1986).
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other areas, intentional behavior can backfire. Full Senate review will,
for example, tend to legitimate the Supreme Court's decisions because
the Justices, by definition, will have satisfied the Senate not only as to
their general qualifications and character, but also as to their political
values, judicial philosophy, and even their probable voting behavior. To
the extent that senators are publicly identified with Justices, it might be
more difficult for senators to engage in public criticism of later judicial
decisions, to vote for either substantive or jurisdictional bills that cut
against the Court's positions, or to consider the drastic remedy of impeachment. If the evident goal of the Senate's advice and consent function is to pick Justices who will make good decisions, bad judicial
performance reflects poorly on senatorial skill and judgment. Moreover,
to the extent that the Senate has taken public responsibility for the views
of the Justices, political accountability is spread and thereby obscured. If
the public disapproves of the work of the Rehnquist Court, it will not be
sufficient to hold the President responsible at the polls; to the extent that
the Senate's role is to shape the Court's performance, it will also be necessary to replace key senators, a more complex and unlikely eventuality. 3 1 In short, the methods for achieving political influence over the
shape of public law include post-appointment controls; it is at least possible that "rubber-stamping" nominees may be more compatible with some
of these than is active screening during the appointment process.
Such risks become more serious to the extent that Senate review
creates only an appearance of selectivity and control. Illusory screening
would create indirect costs for other forms of political control without
direct gains from accurate predications about judicial behavior. There
are a number of reasons to expect more illusion than reality in the screening process. 32 It is commonplace to note that even Presidents are frequently surprised by the behavior of their appointees. This seems
inevitable. The role, viewpoint, associations, and institutional perspective of a Justice are drastically different than for any other job. There is
probably no way even for a nominee to be sure how he or she will react
to those unique circumstances. Presidents at least have the opportunity
to search and select actively; the Senate, no matter how ambitious its
announced objectives, can only reject. No one really knows how Robert
Bork would have voted as a Justice, and it is certainly impossible to
know how different Justice Kennedy will turn out to be than Bork might
have been. In addition, even if thorough ideological screening could be
successful, as Henry Monaghan has noted,33 there are natural limits to
public interest and senatorial energy. Although conscientious review can
be expected to be consistently honored as a matter of rhetoric and form,
31 See Fein, supra note 10, at 674-75.
32 For some difficult and undramatic matters that would be relevant to serious inquiry, see Bork
Hearings,supra note 27, at 1473-75 (testimony of Paul Bator).
33 Monaghan, supra note 2, at 1209.
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thorough screening has been and is likely to be episodic, so that actual
influence over the Court's performance will be limited even under the
most optimistic assumptions.
Nevertheless, as recent history demonstrates, the norm of ideological screening can be expected to produce an occasional event like the
Bork hearings-hearings which represent the most effort and intellectual
seriousness that can reasonably be expected. Bork had an unusually full
record of intellectual writing and of public service, so that senators had a
tempting amount of material from which to make predictions and judgments. The public could be interested in the process because it was plausible to believe that Bork might have significant impact on the Court's
decisions and because some of his expressed views and public behavior
had been controversial. And political efforts expended on the Bork hearings held the promise of a real payoff; that is, since Bork was closely
identified with an Administration that was politically injured and at the
34
end of its term, the classic conditions for rejection existed.
If the Bork hearings represent a high water mark for the modem
norm, what do they tell us about the effectiveness of ideological screening
for achieving political influence over the Court? An answer to this question depends on assumptions about the sorts of political considerations
that should influence the development of public law. There is far less
consensus about this than there is about the more general proposition
that politics should shape law through the appointment process. It is
usually thought that senators should give effect to high-toned reflections
on law and public policy. Thus, Bruce Ackerman describes the Bork
hearings "as a part of this ongoing project in self-government" under a
Constitution which "provid[es] us with institutions and a language by
which we may discriminate between the passing show of normal politics
and the deeper movements in popular opinions which.., ultimately earn
a democratic place in the constitutional law . . . . , Stephen Carter
criticizes the Bork hearings for emphasizing "whether a Bork appointment would further or hinder the articulated interests.., of women, or
of nonwhites, or of... Congress ... .,"36 He suggests that the hearings
should have focused instead on "the fundamental aspirations and longterm interests of the American people."' 37 Ronald Dworkin's description
is different from Carter's, but his prescription is also high-minded. He
says the hearings were "an extended seminar on the Constitution" and
humbly urges that they represent a rejection of "crude historicism" and
34 For efforts to identify factors that favor rejection, see Segal, Senate Confirmation of Supreme
CourtJustices:PartisanandInstitutionalPolitics,49 J.OF POL. 998 (1987); Tannenbaum, Explaining
ControversialNominations: The Fortas Case Revisited, 17 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 573 (1987).
35 Ackerman, supra note 4, at 1178-79 (emphasis in original).
36 Carter, supra note 10, at 1192.
37 Id. at 1196.

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
an acceptance of "a jurisprudence ....

of principle. ' 38 And Laurence

Tribe writes that the ideal is a "concerted, collective effort by the upper
house of Congress to articulate a vision of the Constitution's future, and
to scrutinize potential Justices in that vision's light . . .39
It is only to be expected that if the Senate is to understand its function as creating something so august as constitutional law, we should
gravitate to the most familiar and reassuring model for guiding the Senate's deliberations. And that model, obviously, is judging. Thus, one
paradoxical consequence of self-conscious commitment to political lawcreation is the suppression of the political character of senatorial politics.
Senators should act, we are told, like meta-Justices: since senators, by
choosing the Justices who will develop the law, create the law indirectly,
they should themselves make overarching determinations about the role
of historicism in interpretation, the enduring values of the American people, and so on. In short, we are willing to tolerate political influence over
the law during the process of appointment, but only if politicians adopt
the perspective and the vocabulary of judges.
This gravitational pull of the legal culture was amply illustrated during the Bork hearings. Senators were praised in the press for their
learned questions on textualism, judicial restraint, the place of stare decisis in constitutional law, and other matters of legal philosophy. There
were elaborate debates about arcane legal doctrines, including the proper
standard of review in gender discrimination cases-senators talking
about tiers of scrutiny!-subtle variations in the clear and present danger
test, and the inter-relationship between fifth amendment due process and
fourteenth amendment equal protection. Senators' brows were furrowed
about penumbras and the ninth amendment, about the containability of
the category "political speech," and about the objectivity of the reasonable relationship test as compared to that of the rationality test.
The effects of legalizing political discourse are, given the realist assumptions that underlie the norm of active ideological review, mostly
unfortunate. Because the focus is on legal philosophy and legal doctrine,
nominees have a natural advantage if their views on these subjects are
difficult to ascertain. The issue before the Senate is whether there is some
reason for rejection-that is, whether a nominee has committed or will
commit some intellectual offense. Thus, nominees who are forthcoming
during the hearings or have established records on legal issues will be at
risk more than those whose legal opinions are obscure, nonexistent, or
withheld. One effect, then, of trying to predict judicial behavior is to
favor nominees who are relatively unpredictable. The consequences are
graphically illustrated by the meandering, and often astonishing, performance of the Burger Court.
38 Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, XXXIV N.Y. REv. BooKS 36, 38-40.
39 L. TRIBE, GOD SAVE THIS HONORABLE COURT 131 (1985).
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It is true, on the other hand, that although the Senate cannot be sure
what direction it is giving the Court, ideological review does tend to keep
those with expressed and unacceptable views off the bench. While this is
negative influence over the development of the law, it is influence. However, the legalization of political discourse that accompanies ideological
review means that the legal establishment is likely to control the exercise
of this negative influence. Someone has to advise the senators on how to
participate in judge-like conversations and on how to evaluate the nominees' answers. Who better than the elites of the practicing bar and the
academy? Is Bork outside the mainstream of legal thought? Better ask
those who make up the mainstream. 4° Hence, not only the general values but even specific pet theories of a few eminent professors-theories
about the unenumerated rights of the ninth amendment or the breadth of
the principle at stake in Griswold--can momentarily masquerade as deep
political consensus. This professorial influence accounts for what seems
in retrospect to be the dream-like quality to much of Bork's interrogation. Did senators really insist that constitutional text and framers' intent cannot serve as guides to interpretation and that a judge's fidelity to
such materials would be inconsistent with a two-hundred year "tradition"? 4 1 Did members of Congress actually welcome judicial readiness to
negate legislative decisions and to invite such actions on the basis of the
Justices' feelings about the "needs of the Nation" or the fact of an individual's existence?4 2 And did politicians repeatedly take positions that
could be characterized as supporting judicial solicitude for such politically controversial causes as homosexuality, obscenity, and subversive
speech?43 All these lines of questioning did occur, and in the argumenta40 Of course, the elites were not unanimous in these judgments about Bork; both his supporters
and opponents in the Senate relied on the expressed opinions of legal academics and well-known
practitioners. Most of the witnesses were law professors, including some who were also advising
Committee members, and an astonishing 2,000 law teachers wrote to express their opposition to
confirmation. Bork Hearings, supra note 27, at 1899.
41 See, eg., id. at 259 (Senator Specter arguing that Brown v. Board of Education was "at very
sharp variance with what the Framers had intended"), 578 (Specter arguing that the Court has a
"consistent tradition" of protecting values rooted in conscience of the people rather than in specific
language), 682 (Specter claiming a popular "consensus by the tradition of our Court" that judges
should rule even though they had no law), and 683 (Specter arguing that "law does not depend on an
understanding of original intent" and that original intent may be impossible to identify).
42 See, eg., id. at 262 (Senator Specter's approval of Boiling v. Sharpe based on Justices' "feelings" about "the needs of the nation.") and 296 (Senator Biden arguing that right to privacy arises
because humans exist).
43 Regarding homosexuality, see id. at 88 (Senator Biden asking whether any.legislative body
can regulate sexual behavior of "a married couple, or anyone else"). See also id. at 124-25 (Bork
linking right to privacy with protection of homosexual conduct and use of cocaine and asking Senator Kennedy, "Privacy to do what, Senator?"). As to obscenity, see id. at 256 (Senator Specter
apparently criticizing Bork for having written that the first amendment does not reach pornography
or obscenity). As to subversion, see id. at 412 (Senator Specter defending Holmes's statement that if
proletarian dictatorship is "destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community...
they should be given their chance and have their way.").
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tive, intellectualized atmosphere of the hearings they did not seem to create political embarrassment for senators. But they do not exactly have
those qualities of stolid common sense and moderation that we like to
think characterize the general public's instincts. The questions certainly
reflect views that are fashionable in academic circles. It is a sad irony
that purposeful effort to democratize the Court should result in enhanced
power for groups that already have disproportionate influence over the
shape of the law.
Legalized discourse, of course, did not entirely replace normal politics during the Bork hearings. Although some of the tactics were rough
and unfair, we must look to some of these unjudicious moments to see
how political screening can be constructive. Two of the most troubling
but also most useful parts of the hearings were the exchanges on Griswold
v. Connecticut44 and Shelley v. Kraemer,45 cases that are routinely demolished in first-year law school classrooms. Bork's doubts about the rea44 There were exchanges on Griswoldthroughout the hearings. In my opinion, early questioning
on this case by Senator Biden put Bork on the defensive throughout much of the rest of the process.
Biden began by asking whether Bork believed "that the government has as much right to control a
married couple's decision about... a child... as... to control the public utility's right to pollute
the air." Id. at 114. Bork replied that "where the Constitution does not speak-there is no provision.., that applies to the case-then a judge may not say, I place a higher value upon a marital
relationship than I do upon an economic freedom." Id. Biden again suggested that under Bork's
view economic freedom "has no more or less constitutional protection than the right.., to use...
birth control. . ." Id. at 145. Bork retreated to criticizing how the Court in Griswold had derived
the right. Biden tried to elicit Bork's opinion on whether a right to privacy exists in the Constitution, and Bork continued his attempt to confine the discussion to his criticism of the reasoning in
Griswold. Biden, seemingly weary from the evasions, then asked:
Well, let me say it another way then .... Does a state legislative body, or any legislative body,
have a right to pass a law telling a married couple, or anyone else, that behind ...their bedroom door.., they can or cannot use birth control? Does the majority have the right to tell a
couple that they cannot use birth control?
Id. at 116. To this admirably blunt question, Bork replied, "[t]here is always a rationality standard
...
All I have done was point out that the right to privacy, as defined or undefined by Justice
Douglas, was a free-floating right that was not derived in a principled fashion from constitutional
materials." Id. Against this vague and intellectualized answer, Biden counterposed Douglas's eloquent language about a "right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights. Marriage is a coming together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred ..
Bork
replied that the quoted language was not "the rationale of the case [but only] rhetoric... " Id. at
86-89.
As a challenge to law students or scholars, Bork's claims about the parity-as a matter of legal
authority-between privacy and economic freedom are powerful, but as an implicit expression of
values they seemed cold. And Biden could certainly have assumed that their audience was more
concerned with inferring the nominee's values than with assessing arguments. Similarly, Bork's emphasis on other defects in Griswold's reasoning only publicized problems that are profoundly troubling to the legal mind but not to those whose predominate concern is that the police not enter their
bedrooms. Douglas' language, which Bork formally endorsed (even as he denigrated its legal significance), was the most moving statement in all the confusing argumentation, and thus it was probably
the most authoritative to the audience of nonlawyers.
45 Bork's position on Shelley was a clear statement of the classic criticism first made by Herbert
Wechsler. Id. at 85-86.
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soning in these decisions did not put him outside the mainstream;
intellectually, those doubts and arguments put him near the heart of the
law's commitment to clarity, consistency, and principle. Nevertheless,
Bork came away the loser on both subjects. Why did arguments, which
seem strong in the nation's law school classrooms and in its legal journals, seem weak in the arena of politics?
The reason, obviously, is that what counts in political life is different
from what counts in the legal culture. In politics, ideas and justifications
matter less and they matter differently; consequently, interest in nuance
and abstraction seems suspicious rather than admirable. The position on
Griswold that seemed powerful had little to do with theories of interpretation or the ninth amendment. What was compelling was that people
have come to expect some judicial protection of their sexual privacy and
that they want such protection. The position on Shelley that seemed
powerful had little to do with the legal mainstream's views on state action. What was compelling was that racially exclusionary covenants are
no longer usual or expected, and that the interest of minority groups in
integrated housing has gained wide acceptance and legitimacy. It seemed
quirky, if not sinister, for a nominee to dwell on explanations in arenas
where widespread perceptions of normalcy, intense desires, and stronglyfelt interests are what count.
By exposing legal thinking to broader political values and forms of
discourse, the Bork hearings provided a useful testing ground. While not
a plebiscite or anything close to one, the tone and content of the hearings
sent important messages about the acceptability of decisional outcomes
and justificatory norms to the executive branch, to sitting judges, and to
would-be judges. This sort of influence depends not on selection, but on
communication. It is "advice." The desire to give advice is one reason
senators want to confront nominees personally. As Senator Specter said
after a mutually respectful exchange with Bork on the tradition of extratextual interpretation in American jurisprudence:
But perhaps it is sufficient, Judge Bork, if you say that the argument is
a powerful argument from strong tradition, because part of our process here
...- this is the only time that anyone gets to talk to a potential Supreme
Court nominee or to a Federal Judge ....
So if you are confirmed, we will never have a chance to talk to you
again. [Bork replied,] "Well, you can talk to me, Senator; it may not be
under these lights." [And Specter '4said,]
"[I]t will not be under these lights,
6
and it will not be quite this way."
Unfortunately, the legalization of discourse during the Bork hearings crowded out much of the politics, giving nonlegal standards only
occasional and implicit force. Consider how little information was developed, in all those days of witnesses and questioning, on the actual effects
of the Supreme Court's doctrines and decisions. A few representatives of
46 Id. at 686.
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law enforcement organizations spoke about crime and dangers to police
officers, 47 and black politicians emphasized the importance of the
changes that the Warren Court achieved in the South, 4 8 and economist
Thomas Sowell offered an opinion about the effects of affirmative action. 49 On the other hand, an overwhelming proportion of the witnesses
were law professors who spoke of philosophy and doctrine, and these
subjects also dominated the senators' statements and questions.
There was virtually no interest in whether the performance of the
Court in the last ten or twenty years has been good for the country or in
how that performance might be improved. What have the federal courts
done to public schooling? Have they in fact reduced discipline and
sapped local involvement? How much racial integration has been
achieved, and should numerical balance be given more or less priority in
the years ahead? Have the Court's separation of powers decisions on
matters such as the legislative veto turned out to be, as many at first
feared, harmful to maintaining accountability over administrative agencies? Have the privacy decisions strengthened or undermined family life?
How serious an impediment has the exclusionary rule been to effective
law enforcement? Has extension of free speech protections in areas like
campaign finance regulation and defamation been healthy or destructive
for our system of free debate? Are there threats to our constitutional
values to which the Court has attached too little importance? Have
standing rules barred the adjudication of important claims? Are religious minorities being treated fairly in our schools and other public
places? Such questions could not have been answered definitively; it
would not have been possible even to begin to deal with all of them. But
time would better have been spent on these kinds of questions than on
the bottomless jurisprudential and doctrinal issues to which the senators
devoted most of their resources. Given their extraordinary character, the
Bork hearings could have been the occasion for a usefully concrete assessment of the work of the Court.
If the legal culture is properly concerned with ideas, the political
culture is properly concerned with the consequences of ideas-with the
everyday effects of abstractions on perception, aspiration, and self-interest. The Senate's pre-occupation with the decision whether to consent to
Bork's nomination left little room for the development of the sort of information and overt pressure that could have amounted to important advice about whether and in what respects the Supreme Court should be
changing direction.
47 Id. at 642 (statement of John Bellizzi).
48 Id. at 785 (statement of Barbara Jordan).
49 Id. at 906-07, 914-17.
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CONCLUSION

The Bork hearings were the most that can be hoped for from the
modem norm of active Senate review. This norm is based on the assumption that politics should help shape the law. To the extent that the
hearings required a judicial nominee to listen to and speak the language
of politics, they provided limited but significant political influence over
the Court. Unfortunately, this language was often excluded or submerged. The Bork hearings, therefore, certainly raise a serious doubt
about whether, especially on more ordinary occasions, purposeful, selfconscious efforts to predict and control outcomes are consistent with the
assumption that politics can bring something important to bear on public
law through appointment decisions. The hearings were at their best
when they created a political forum-a place where the answers that
dominate in the legal culture were not fully satisfactory and where legal
discourse seemed limited and sounded tinny. They were at their worst
when senators tried to be judges, which they did as a natural result of
their efforts to exert indirect control over doctrines and outcomes.
Achieving appropriate democratic influence over the Supreme Court requires more concern with past performance and less with prediction,
more self-assurance about politics and less pre-occupation with law.

